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11 Introduction
Auctions are important and widely employed trading mechanisms. The well-
known advantages of using auctions diminish when bidders collude for which
they have ample incentives. However, the bidders￿problem of ￿nding a way
to pro￿tably collude and share the generated collusive surplus is complicated
by the possibility of each having private information.
Much of the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions treats it as
a mechanism design problem with a special focus on feasibility of e¢ cient
collusive mechanisms when side-payments are possible.1 Graham and Mar-
shall (1987) analyze collusion in second-price sealed bid and English auctions
with independent private values. For instance, in the context of a second-
price auction with a reserve price, they show that a second-price pre-auction
knockout run by an outside agent is an incentive-e¢ cient and durable mech-
anism in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). The knockout is also
ex-ante budget balanced among bidders. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) con-
sider second-price auctions with a reserve price and heterogeneous bidders,
and show that for any subset of bidders there exists an incentive compat-
ible and individually rational collusive mechanism that is ex post budget
balanced and e¢ cient. McAfee and McMillan (1992) study collusion in ￿rst-
price sealed-bid auctions, also in the independent private values setting, and
show that e¢ cient collusion among all bidders with ex post budget balancing
is possible and can be implemented with a ￿rst-price pre-auction knockout.2
All these papers follow the standard mechanism design approach in that
when they consider (interim) individual rationality constraints they compare
bidders￿interim payo⁄s from the collusive mechanism with those from an
equilibrium of the seller￿ s auction, i.e., the status quo. Note, however, that
the status quo here is a strategic interaction, and its outcome is a⁄ected
by bidders￿beliefs about others￿values. This observation is important if
bidders are making interim participation decisions for the collusive mecha-
nism, as pointed out by Cramton and Palfrey (1995; hereafter CP) in the
general mechanism design problem. Others can make inferences about a bid-
der￿ s type from her choice between the collusive mechanism and the status
quo, which in turn may a⁄ect the outcome of the status quo game if it is
1There is a recent literature on repeated auctions. See, for example, Aoyagi (2003),
Blume and Heidhues (2002), and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004).
2Also see the recent work by Marshall and Marx (2006) on collusive mechanisms with a
focus on those that do not rely on information from the auctioneer and are not all-inclusive.
2played. CP refers to this possibility as the information leakage problem from
participation decisions.3 To address this problem they consider a two-stage
process: Players simultaneously vote for or against the proposed mechanism.
This vote occurs at the interim stage, i.e., when players have private infor-
mation. If the mechanism is unanimously rati￿ed, then it is implemented;
otherwise the status quo game is played under revised beliefs where these
satisfy consistency requirements in the spirit of rational expectations.4
In this paper we apply CP￿ s approach to show that the standard e¢ cient
collusive mechanisms characterized in the literature for the independent pri-
vate values environment are not rati￿able when the status quo is a second-
price auction and there are participation costs, however small they may be.5
In other words, in our setting the e¢ cient collusive mechanisms will not be
rati￿ed by all types of all bidders. Bidders with high values will (credibly)
signal that they have high values by vetoing the proposed cartel mechanism:
A veto (believed to be by a high-valued bidder) discourages other bidders￿
participation in the auction, and as a result, the high-valued vetoer￿ s payo⁄
from the auction exceeds her payo⁄from the cartel mechanism. To be a little
bit more speci￿c, suppose that a veto of the proposed cartel mechanism by
bidder i leads others to believe that her value is greater than vN. Then, in
the ensuing auction there is an equilibrium such that bidder i￿ s payo⁄in this
equilibrium is higher than her payo⁄ from the cartel if and only if her value
is greater than vN. In other words, a veto, believed to be by a bidder whose
value is higher than vN, is pro￿table only for these types, justifying others￿
beliefs about the vetoer. Hence, the cartel mechanism is not rati￿able. This
is the case even though the cartel mechanism is individually rational in the
standard sense, i.e., when bidders￿interim payo⁄s from it are compared to
those from the equilibrium of the auction with prior (or, passive) beliefs.
Since entry fees and all kinds of participation costs are frequently observed
in practice, our ￿nding indicates that collusion may not be as easy to achieve
3There is also the possibility of information leakage from the selection of the mechanism,
i.e., the informed seller￿ s problem; see, for example, Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole
(1990), and, in a bargaining context, Yilankaya (1999).
4The re￿nement is based on Grossman and Perry (1986). See CP for a detailed discus-
sion of this choice and comparisons with other re￿nements that restrict ￿o⁄the equilibrium
path￿beliefs in di⁄erent ways, as well as the relationship between rati￿ability and dura-
bility (Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983).
5In the analysis below, (bidder) ￿participation cost￿ can be replaced by ￿entry fee￿
(charged by the seller) without any change in the formal model or results. Accordingly,
we will use both interpretations in our discussions.
3as the previous literature has suggested. Moreover, the seller may use entry
fees to destabilize potential collusive arrangements among bidders.
Recently, Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2004) studied the collusion prob-
lem in a¢ liated private value and common value environments, using the
standard mechanism design approach. They show that, among other things,
in some common value cases where the winner￿ s curse e⁄ect is strong, no
e¢ cient collusive mechanism will be (interim) individually rational in the
standard sense, i.e., with passive beliefs: bidders with high signals are bet-
ter o⁄ if no one colludes. In this paper we show, in our independent private
values setting, that the e¢ cient collusive mechanism, which satis￿es the stan-
dard interim individual rationality constraints, is not rati￿able because of the
information leakage problem we discussed above. In addition to such factors
as internal enforcement problem of a bidding ring, antitrust concern, and de-
tection by the seller that are discussed in the literature, information leakage
from bidders￿participation decisions and the winner￿ s curse are also potential
sources of obstacles to collusion in auction markets.6
Our main result has a similar ￿ avor to an example in CP (p. 267-269)
concerning collusion in a duopolistic setting, which we discuss next. Two
￿rms have private information about their (constant) marginal costs that are
drawn from a uniform distribution. The status quo is a (Bayesian) Cournot
game with an a¢ ne the inverse demand function. Using the standard mech-
anism design approach, one can ￿nd (see Cramton and Palfrey, 1990) the
joint-monopoly mechanism that is incentive compatible, e¢ cient (only the
lowest-cost ￿rm produces), and individually rational (in the standard sense).
However, as CP shows this mechanism is not rati￿able. By vetoing the mech-
anism a ￿rms sends a credible signal that it has relatively low marginal cost,
which decreases the other ￿rm￿ s output in the ensuing Cournot game. The
veto is a credible signal, since it is precisely these low cost types that bene￿t
from the decrease in the other ￿rm￿ s output su¢ ciently that their pro￿ts
in the Cournot game (with revised beliefs) end up being higher than their
pro￿ts in the joint-monopoly mechanism.
In the next section we brie￿ y describe the setup, discuss the concept of
rati￿ability and present our main ￿nding. Section 3 contains discussions
about possible extensions and some remarks. Proofs are in the Appendix.
6Note that the rati￿ability concept does not always strengthen participation con-
straints; see CP (p. 269) for an example. So, it may be possible that an e¢ cient col-
lusive mechanism in a common value setting is rati￿able even though it is not individually
rational in the standard sense.
42 The Model and the Main Result
A single indivisible object is being sold by a seller who uses a sealed-bid
second-price auction with no reserve price.7 Consider a standard indepen-
dent private values environment. There are n ￿ 2 risk-neutral (potential)
bidders. Bidders￿values for the object are independent draws from the same
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(:) with continuous and strictly pos-
itive density f(:) on its support [0;1]. Bidder i￿ s value, vi, is her private
information. There is a bidder participation cost, or entry fee, common to
all bidders, denoted by c 2 (0;1). Bidders know their values before they
decide whether to participate in the auction and must pay c in order to be
able to submit a bid; they do not know others￿participation decisions when
they make theirs. All of the above is common knowledge.
2.1 The Status Quo: Non-cooperative Play
The status quo game we consider is the second-price auction. Let the feasible
action set for any type of bidder be: fNog[[0;1), where ￿No￿denotes not
participating. Bidder i incurs the participation cost i⁄her action is di⁄erent
from ￿No￿ . Let bi(:) denote i￿ s strategy.
In the presence of a participation cost, it is not a weakly dominant strat-
egy for a bidder to always bid her value in the seller￿ s auction. However, if
a bidder ￿nds participating optimal, then she cannot do better than bidding
her value.8 Let G(y) = F(y)n￿1 denote the cdf of the highest valuation of
n ￿ 1 bidders. It is easy to see that there exists a unique (up to changes for
a measure zero set of values) symmetric (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium where




No if v ￿ v0
v if v > v0
;
where v0G(v0) = c.9 The (expected) payo⁄ of a type-v bidder in this equi-
7We assume zero reserve price to keep the discussion and notation simple. The analysis
and results hold when there is a binding reserve price.
8See, for example, Matthews (1995). Therefore, throughout the paper, we only consider
equilibria in undominated strategies where each bidder bids her value if it is greater than
a certain cuto⁄, does not participate otherwise.
9There may be reasonable asymmetric equilibria as well. Tan and Yilankaya (2006)
show that concavity (respectively, strict convexity) of F(:) is a su¢ cient condition for
uniqueness (respectively, multiplicity) of equilibrium in undominated strategies.




0 if v ￿ v0
vG(v0) +
R v
v0(v ￿ y)dG(y) ￿ c if v > v0
;




0 if v ￿ v0 R v
v0 G(y)dy if v > v0
:
2.2 The E¢ cient All-Inclusive Cartel Mechanism
Suppose transfers among bidders are possible. Bidders may design a collusive
bidding mechanism outside of the seller￿ s auction. If the all-inclusive cartel
mechanism is ex post e¢ cient, i.e., the bidder with the highest value acquires
the object if this value is greater than the participation cost, then it does
not matter whether there is a participation cost or a reserve price in the
seller￿ s auction provided that their magnitudes are the same. Therefore, it
follows from Mailath and Zemsky (1991) and McAfee and McMillan (1992)
that there exists an incentive compatible, ex post budget balanced, and ex
post e¢ cient all-inclusive (symmetric) cartel mechanism m where the payo⁄
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for all v 2 [0;1]. That is, the e¢ cient cartel mechanism m is interim individ-
ually rational in the standard sense with respect to symmetric equilibrium
payo⁄s in the seller￿ s auction.
The e¢ cient cartel mechanism can be implemented by a ￿rst-price or
second-price pre-auction knockout in which all bidders compete for the right
to be the sole bidder in the seller￿ s auction. In the case of a ￿rst-price
knockout auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays her bid,
which will be shared equally among the losers.
62.3 Ratifying the Cartel Mechanism
Our main objective in this paper is to study whether the e¢ cient cartel mech-
anism described above can still be used by bidders if we allow the possibility
of learning from their decisions to participate in it. The outside option faced
by bidders when they are deciding to participate in the cartel, i.e., the status
quo game, is a second-price auction with participation costs. The outcome
of the auction, naturally, depends on bidders￿beliefs about others￿values,
which in turn may be a⁄ected by their participation decisions in the cartel.
We consider a two-stage rati￿cation game to analyze this problem, fol-
lowing CP. In the ￿rst stage, bidders simultaneously vote (interim) for or
against m, the e¢ cient cartel mechanism.10 In the second stage, if the car-
tel mechanism is unanimously accepted then it is implemented; otherwise,
bidders participate in the second-price auction knowing who had vetoed the
cartel mechanism, and thus having updated beliefs about vetoers￿values.11;12
The standard individual rationality conditions implicitly assume that be-
liefs following a possible veto are passive: The payo⁄s from the cartel mecha-
nism are compared with the payo⁄s from the equilibrium of the auction with
prior beliefs (values of all bidders, including the vetoer, are distributed on
[0;1] according to F(:)). As we remarked earlier, m is individually rational
in this sense; see (IR). Therefore, there is a sequential equilibrium of the
rati￿cation game, supported by passive beliefs after a possible veto, in which
m is unanimously accepted in the ￿rst stage (see also Proposition 1 in CP).
Assuming passive beliefs following a veto, however, may not be reasonable
in the rati￿cation game, as CP argues. Other bidders may draw inferences
about the vetoer￿ s type. CP proposes a re￿nement of equilibria to address
this issue. Applied to our problem, the cartel mechanism is rati￿able, if,
in addition, other bidders￿beliefs about the vetoer￿ s value satisfy certain
consistency requirements.13 In particular, if bidder i vetoes the mechanism,
then the rest of the bidders try to rationalize i￿ s veto decision by identifying
10We follow CP, and much of the literature on collusion from a mechanism design per-
spective, in requiring that an ￿uninformed third party￿proposes the cartel mechanism.
11Since our setup is symmetric, it is su¢ cient for our results that bidders learn only the
number of vetoers.
12Our main result still holds even if after a veto the remaining n￿1 bidders manage to
form an e¢ cient partial cartel. (See the discussion in Section 3 for more on this point.)
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting us to consider this possibility.
13Since we will be looking for an equilibrium in which bidders unanimously ratify the
cartel mechanism, we only need to be concerned about unilateral deviations.
7a set of types for i (the veto set, denoted by Vi) that could have bene￿ted
from the veto. Let b be an equilibrium of the second-price auction with
participation cost c where others believe that i￿ s type is in Vi.14 For example,
if Vi = [vN;1], then b is an equilibrium of the auction where rati￿ers￿values
are distributed on [0;1] according to F(:); and the vetoer￿ s value is believed
to be distributed on [vN;1] according to FN(v) ￿
F(v)￿F(vN)
1￿F(vN) , which is derived
from F(:) using the Bayes￿rule. Let Ui(v;b) be type-v vetoer￿ s payo⁄ in b.
The veto set Vi is credible if there is an equilibrium of the post-veto
auction with updated beliefs which gives the types in (respectively, outside)
Vi higher (respectively, lower) payo⁄ than the cartel mechanism. In other
words, types in a credible veto set have an incentive, possibly weak, to veto
the mechanism if doing so makes other bidders believe that they belong to
this set, which in turn justi￿es others￿beliefs. Finally, the cartel mechanism
is rati￿able if either there is no credible veto set for any player or there exists
one where all types in the veto set are actually indi⁄erent between the cartel
mechanism and the equilibrium in the seller￿ s auction.
The formal de￿nitions are as follows:
De￿nition 1 Vi ￿ [0;1] is a credible veto set for i if there exists an equilib-
rium b in the post-veto auction (where other bidders￿beliefs about i￿ s type v
are Bayes update of their prior, conditioning on v 2 Vi) such that
i) Vi 6= ;;
ii) Ui(v;b) > Um(v) ) v 2 Vi;
iii) Ui(v;b) < Um(v) ) v = 2 Vi:
De￿nition 2 The cartel mechanism is rati￿able against the seller￿ s auction
if for all i either
i) there does not exist a credible veto set for i, or
ii) there exists a credible veto set Vi and a corresponding equilibrium b in
the post-veto auction such that Ui(v;b) = Um(v) for all v 2 Vi:
The above de￿nitions are slightly di⁄erent from CP￿ s, since we have al-
ready incorporated the fact that the cartel mechanism is incentive compatible
and individually rational (with passive beliefs). Given these de￿nitions, we
now present the main result of our paper.
Proposition 1 The e¢ cient cartel mechanism m is not rati￿able.
14We are suppressing the dependence of b on Vi to keep the notation simpler.
8The basic intuition behind the result is as follows. Low-value bidders have
relatively more to gain by participating in the cartel mechanism than high-
value bidders. By vetoing the cartel mechanism, a high-value bidder sends a
signal that she has a high value, which would discourage other bidders from
participating in the seller￿ s auction and bene￿t the vetoer. On the other
hand, a low-value bidder is not able to gain from this e⁄ect of vetoing as
much. This makes vetoing by high-value bidders credible.
To present the above intuition formally, and as the ￿rst step for proving
the result, we will construct a credible veto set (for each bidder). We will
then show that there is no credible veto set where all types belonging to it
would be indi⁄erent between vetoing and ratifying (Lemma 2).
Suppose that when one of the bidders vetoes the cartel mechanism, others
believe that her value exceeds a cuto⁄ point vN < 1.15 We will show that
there is an equilibrium of the auction with these revised beliefs such that the
vetoer￿ s payo⁄ in this equilibrium is larger (respectively, smaller) than her
cartel payo⁄ if her value is larger (respectively, smaller) than vN. In other
words, it is precisely the types in [vN;1] who would want to veto the cartel
mechanism if a veto causes other bidders to believe that the vetoer￿ s type is
in [vN;1], so that Vi = [vN;1] is a credible veto set for any bidder i.16
Consider the second-price auction where the rati￿ers￿values are distrib-
uted on [0;1] according to F(:) and the vetoer i￿ s value is distributed on
[vN;1] according to FN(v), de￿ned earlier. The equilibrium we consider in
this auction, denoted by b￿, is given by
b
￿





No if v ￿ vY
v if v > vY
for all j 6= i:
In this equilibrium, the rati￿ers (who are symmetric) use a common cuto⁄
vY, which is determined by the indi⁄erence to participation condition. For
any given rati￿er, the maximum of others￿values is distributed on [vN;1]
according to ^ G(y) ￿ F(y)n￿2FN(y): Let e vY be the solution to
Z e vY
vN
(e vY ￿ y)d ^ G(y) = c;
15Naturally, vN depends on the participation cost as well as other exogenous variables;
this dependence is suppressed in the notation. Also, ￿N￿is for saying ￿no￿to the cartel
mechanism (the vetoer), and ￿Y ￿is for saying ￿yes￿(rati￿ers).
16Types in (vN;1] strictly prefer to veto, whereas vN is indi⁄erent.
9where the left-hand side denotes the payo⁄ of a e vY-type rati￿er whenever
e vY ￿ 1: We have vY = minf1;e vYg and vN < vY ￿ 1. Notice that vY is a
strictly increasing function of vN until it reaches 1 for some value of vN and
stays there for higher values of vN:
Since the best any player can do is to bid her valuation if she chooses to
participate in the auction, the payo⁄of any type-v bidder i if she vetoes the
cartel mechanism is (given the rati￿ers￿belief that her type is in [vN;1] and









0 if y ￿ vY
y if y > vY
is the price paid by the vetoer in case she wins the object.
Comparing this payo⁄ with the one from the cartel mechanism leads to
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 There exists a (unique) vN 2 (c;1) such that
Ui(v;b
￿) > (=) U
m(v) i⁄ v > (=) vN:
Lemma 1 shows that if, after a veto of the cartel mechanism by bidder i,
others believe that her value exceeds vN (and the equilibrium b￿ is played),
then i would bene￿t from such a veto i⁄ her value exceeds vN. Thus, Vi =
[vN;1] is a credible veto set for player i. Furthermore, there does not exist
any credible veto set for which all types in this set are indi⁄erent between
vetoing and ratifying. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There does not exist a credible veto set Vi (for any i) and a cor-
responding equilibrium b in the post-veto auction such that Ui(v;b) = Um(v)
for all v 2 Vi.
Proposition 1 then follows from De￿nition 2 and Lemmas 1 and 2.
The cuto⁄ of the credible veto set vN (Lemma 1) naturally depends on
the cdf F(:), the number of bidders n and the participation cost c. To see the
impact of a positive participation cost, consider two extreme cases. Given
F(:) and n, when c is large the veto set is such that vY = 1, i.e., the rati￿ers
10do not participate in the auction following a veto. For instance, suppose
n = 2; F(v) = v, and c = 2=3. Then it can be easily computed that vY = 1
and vN = 0:686. In the other extreme, as c goes to 0, both vN and vY

















where the left-hand side is the payo⁄of type-v￿
N vetoer in the post-veto auc-
tion and the right-hand side is her payo⁄ from the cartel mechanism (see
Section 2.2), both when c = 0. Notice that v￿
N > 0. This implies that
even when c = 0 the e¢ cient cartel mechanism is not rati￿able. However,
we do not want to emphasize this point. The issue is, when c = 0; in the
post-veto auction where the vetoer￿ s type is known to be in [v￿
N;1], there is
an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which all types of rati￿ers
participate (rather than only those in [v￿
N;1]). If this is the post-veto equi-
librium, then bidders clearly will not have an incentive to veto. Notice that,
a positive c, however small, eliminates this issue, rati￿ers with values less
than v￿
N will never participate in the post-veto auction, and the cuto⁄ they
use will approach to v￿
N from above as c goes to zero.
3 Discussion
Since the seller￿ s mechanism is a second-price auction, our analysis and main
￿nding apply to the case of heterogeneous bidders. Our main result also
carries over to partial cartels, however small. Suppose k bidders form a car-
tel, where 1 < k < n. Assume that the cartel uses a mechanism that is
ex post e¢ cient, incentive compatible and balances the budget (see Mailath
and Zemsky, 1991), and that it sends a representative member to bid in
the auction, if bid at all. From non-members￿viewpoint, the cartel￿ s (maxi-
mum) value has a distribution F k(:). As before we assume that a unanimous
agreement is required to ratify the cartel mechanism. To see whether this
mechanism is rati￿able, suppose one of cartel members deviates and vetoes
it. We can compute the equilibrium payo⁄s in the second-price auction where
the rati￿ers believe that the vetoer￿ s type is in [vN;1] for some vN 2 (0;1),
and the non-members still think that the cartel is still in operation. We can
then determine the cuto⁄ vN in the same way as we did in Section 2, so
11that [vN;1] is a credible veto set, showing that the cartel mechanism is not
rati￿able.17
We assumed that the cartel disintegrates after a veto by one of its mem-
bers, following CP￿ s original de￿nitions. An alternative is to assume the
formation of an e¢ cient partial cartel by n ￿ 1 non-vetoers.18 Even if this
were the case, our main result would not change, i.e., the cartel mechanism
we considered would still be not rati￿able. The reason is that, apart from
participation cuto⁄s, the vetoer is concerned only about the highest valu-
ation of the other bidders in the post-veto auction, and whether the other
bidders collude e¢ ciently (and send only the one with the highest-valuation
to the auction) or bid non-cooperatively is immaterial in this respect. The
magnitudes of participation cuto⁄s in the equilibrium of post-veto auction
(vN and vY) may change if non-vetoers can collude, but this has no impact on
our result, which is qualitative in nature, about the existence of a vN 2 (0;1)
for which [vN;1] is a credible veto set.
How would the seller respond to the presence of collusive bidding arrange-
ments? The literature has mostly focused on the seller￿ s response to possible
collusion by appropriately choosing a reserve price. For instance, Graham
and Marshall (1987) have shown that the seller￿ s optimal reserve price with
a bidding cartel is always greater than the one without a cartel. Our analysis
suggests that the entry fee, independent of its magnitude, may be a useful
tool in dealing with bidder collusion. Moreover, it is as good an instrument
as the reserve price in terms of maximizing revenue in this setup.
We next discuss how allowing bidders to correlate their participation de-
cisions in the post-veto auction may a⁄ect our results, and along the way
elaborate on a subtle issue about the rati￿ability de￿nition in general. To
prove that the e¢ cient cartel mechanism m is not rati￿able, we ￿rst showed
the existence of a credible veto set: There is an equilibrium of the post-veto
auction with updated beliefs (the vetoer￿ s type is believed to be in [vN;1]) in
which vetoer types in (vN;1] (respectively, [0;vN)) obtain strictly higher (re-
spectively, lower) payo⁄s than they do in m.19 There may be other equilibria
17Along the lines of Lemma 2, one can show that the second part of the rati￿ability
de￿nition will not be satis￿ed either.
18This may not be warranted, since this partial cartel will also have the rati￿ability
problem, as suggested by our discussion in the previous paragraph.
19This observation is su¢ cient to prove that m is not ￿strongly rati￿able,￿which requires
the indi⁄erence condition for all credible veto beliefs, rather than just one (in De￿nition
2 part ii); see CP for a discussion). If we use this stronger concept, then the following
12given the updated beliefs, however.20 The possible multiplicity per se is not a
problem. If anything, all types in the veto set could have been indi⁄erent to
m in one of these equilibria, making m rati￿able. (As we showed in Lemma
2, this is not possible.) An equilibrium where some vetoer types are strictly
worse o⁄, on the other hand, cannot be used to rationalize a possible veto.
However, if we allow bidders￿strategies to be correlated in the post-veto auc-
tion, rather than requiring them to constitute a (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium,
we can construct credible veto sets with indi⁄erence using the multiplicity.21
To illustrate this, suppose that there are two bidders, F(v) is strictly convex,
and the participation cost is high enough.22 Consider the veto set f1g. There
is an equilibrium in the post-veto auction where the vetoer participates and
the rati￿er stays out, in which the vetoer￿ s payo⁄is strictly greater than that
in m. There is another one where she stays out and the rati￿er participates
i⁄ her value is greater than the cost of participation, giving zero payo⁄ to
the vetoer. Therefore, the vetoer with value 1 would be indi⁄erent between
m and some convex combination of these two equilibria, whereas those with
lower values would strictly prefer m, making f1g a credible veto set.
We leave it to the reader to appraise the pros and cons of considering
coordinated participation decisions between the vetoer, who rejected the col-
lusive agreement, and other bidders. At any rate, we prove the following in
the Appendix: If the participation cost is low enough, then our main result
still holds, i.e., m is not rati￿able, even when we allow bidders strategies in
the post-veto auction to be correlated (with publicly observable signals).
There are several empirical studies that o⁄er evidence of collusion in
many auction markets.23 In these studies, the status quo game is typically
a ￿rst-price sealed-bid auction. Even when bidders are ex-ante symmetric,
to investigate rati￿ability of collusive arrangements, one needs to consider
discussion becomes moot.
20See Tan and Yilankaya (2006), especially for the roles played by the shape of the cdf
and high participation cost in the following discussion.
21We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
22For example, let F(v) = v2 and c ￿ c ￿ 0:366, where c is the cost level that would
make a bidder with value 1 indi⁄erent to participating if the other￿ s cuto⁄ is c, i.e.,
F(c) +
R 1
c (1 ￿ y)dF(y) ￿ c = 0. Note that when c < c a bidder with value 1 participates
in the auction in every equilibrium.
23Examples include highway construction contracts (Porter and Zona, 1993), school milk
delivery (Pesendorfer, 2000; Porter and Zona, 1999), timber auctions (Baldwin, Marshall
and Richard, 1997), and federal o⁄shore oil and gas lease auctions (Hendricks, Porter, and
Tan, 2004).
13asymmetric auctions induced by possible vetoes which are, generally, di¢ cult
to analyze.24 We want to remark, however, that when there are two bidders
and there are no participation costs, veto sets of the form [vN;1] that we
considered in this paper will not be credible if the status quo is a ￿rst-price
auction, since the vetoer will be hurt from being known as the ￿strong￿
bidder.25 Sets of the form [0;vN] will not be credible either, since the vetoer
whose value is zero will receive a payo⁄ of zero in every equilibrium of the
post-veto auction, which is less than what she would get from the cartel
mechanism.
Finally, it should be noted that, we have only shown that the well-known
e¢ cient cartel mechanism is not rati￿able in our setting.26 We leave for
future research the question of whether there are other (ine¢ cient) collusive
arrangements which are immune to problems associated with information
leakage from members￿participation decisions. Comparing the performance
of di⁄erent auction formats in this regard also seems to be a worthwhile
exercise.
4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In what follows we drop the bidder indices to simplify






0 if v < c
G(vY )
vG(vY) ￿ c if c
G(vY ) ￿ v ￿ vY
vG(v) ￿
R v
vY ydG(y) ￿ c if v > vY
:
24As Marshall and Marx (2006) show, when the seller uses a ￿rst-price auction, there
are other di¢ culties with the e¢ cient collusive mechanism considered here if the cartel
cannot enforce its recommended bids or shill bidding is possible. These problems do not
arise in our setting where the seller uses a second-price auction.
25Consider the auction where the rati￿er￿ s (the ￿weak￿bidder) value is distributed by
F(:) on [0;1], and the vetoer￿ s (the ￿strong￿ bidder) by FN(:) on [vN;1]; derived from
F(:) using Bayes￿rule, with vN > 0. It follows from Maskin and Riley (2000, p. 425)
that the payo⁄ of the vetoer is lower than what she would get if both bidders were weak,
which in turn is lower than what she would get in the cartel mechanism (due to individual
rationality with passive beliefs). Hence, no type in [vN;1] would like to veto the mechanism
if a veto signals that the vetoer￿ s value is in [vN;1].
26This nonrati￿ability result still holds if we consider mechanisms that send the highest-
value bidder to the seller￿ s auction i⁄ her value is larger than a certain cuto⁄ that may be
strictly higher than the participation cost.
14We will ￿rst ￿nd a vN for which U(vN;b￿) = Um(vN), and then check the
inequalities.
Since c < vN ￿ vY; it su¢ ces to show (making dependence of vY on vN
explicit)





￿(v) = vG(vY(v)) ￿
Z v
c
G(y)dy ￿ c ￿ ￿:
Notice that
￿
0(v) = G(vY(v)) + vg(vY(v))v
0
Y(v) ￿ G(v) > 0
for v < 1; since vY(v) ￿ v. Since ￿(v) is continuous, ￿(c) < 0; and ￿(1) > 0,




m(v) for v > (<)vN:
Fix c, and hence vN and vY: Notice that, c ￿ c
G(vY ) < vN ￿ vY. The payo⁄
di⁄erence U(v;b￿) ￿ Um(v) is continuous and given by
￿￿ if v < c
￿
R v




c G(y)dy ￿ ￿ ￿ c if c





c G(y)dy ￿ ￿ ￿ c if v > vY
:
First, notice that U(v;b￿) ￿ Um(v) < 0 for v < c
G(vY ). Let
’(v) = vG(vY) ￿
Z v
c
G(y)dy ￿ ￿ ￿ c:
Note that ’(vN) = ￿(vN) = 0: Moreover, ’0(v) = G(vY) ￿ G(v) > 0 for
v < vY and ’0(vY) = 0: It follows that ’(v) < 0 for v < vN, ’(vN) = 0,
and ’(v) > 0 for v > vN, with ’(v) reaching its maximum, which is strictly






for v > vY. Hence,
U(v;b
￿) > (<)U
m(v) for v > (<)vN:
15The claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there
exists a credible veto set V (for any bidder i; we are again suppressing bidder
indices) and a corresponding equilibrium in the post-veto auction b such that
U(v;b) = U
m(v) for all v 2 V: (1)
Note that it must be the case that U(v;b) > 0 for all v 2 V , because
Um(v) > 0 for all v 2 [0;1]. Let a￿ = inf V . Since any vetoer type￿ s
payo⁄would be zero if she were not participating in the auction, the vetoer￿ s
cuto⁄ in b must be a￿ ￿ c, i.e., all vetoer types participate the auction with
probability one.27 Moreover, the continuity of payo⁄ functions imply that
v = a￿ satis￿es (1) as well. Let a1 < a2 < ::: < aJ be the cuto⁄s of the
rati￿ers where aj 2 [0;1] is used by nj bidders and
PJ
j=1 nj = n ￿ 1.
Suppose that a￿ < 1. It must be that a1 > a￿, since otherwise the rati￿ers
using a1 are sure to lose in the auction, and thus have a negative payo⁄. For










which is strictly increasing in v, since
QJ
j=1 F(aj)nj ￿ F(a1)n￿1 > G(v).
So, types in (a￿; a1) have a strict incentive to veto, and therefore must also
belong to the veto set V (see condition ii) of De￿nition 1), which contradicts
(1).
Now suppose that a￿ = 1, i.e., V = f1g. Given that the vetoer is par-
ticipating with probability one, none of the rati￿ers will participate, and
thus
U(1;b) = 1 ￿ c > U
m(1);
a contradiction.
We now allow bidders strategies in the post-veto auction to be correlated
(with publicly observable signals). We show that our main result still holds,
as long as the participation cost is low enough. Let V be a credible veto
set (for bidder i) and bK = fbk;￿kgk2K (K ￿nite,
P
k2K ￿k = 1) denote
a corresponding correlated equilibrium where the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
27Note that if a vetoer type (strictly) mixes over her participation decision in b, then
she must be indi⁄erent, and hence her overall payo⁄ will be zero as well.
16(BNE) bk is played with probability ￿k. We make the dependence of payo⁄s to
the participation cost explicit, since our result will depend on its magnitude.
Let U(v;bK;c) =
P
k2K ￿kU(v;bk;c) denote type-v vetoer￿ s payo⁄in bK where
U(v;bk;c) is her payo⁄in bk and Um(v;c) is her payo⁄in the cartel mechanism
m, all when the participation cost is c.
Proposition 1A. The e¢ cient cartel mechanism m is not rati￿able if
c is low enough, even when we allow correlated post-veto equilibria (with
publicly observable signals).
Proof. In Lemma 1 we showed the existence of credible veto sets for all
c. Therefore, we only need to prove the counterpart of Lemma 2, i.e., there
exists a c0 > 0 such that if c 2 (0;c0) no credible veto set V (for any player)
and a corresponding bK satisfying the following indi⁄erence condition exists:
U(v;bK;c) = U
m(v;c) for all v 2 V: (2)
Given c 2 (0;1), de￿ne ￿(v) = v ￿c￿Um(v;c), where v ￿c is the maximum
payo⁄that type v can get in any BNE in which she participates. Let e v(c) be
such that ￿(e v(c)) = 0. Note that e v(c) is uniquely de￿ned and e v(c) 2 (c;1),
since ￿(v) is strictly increasing with ￿(c) = ￿￿ < 0 and ￿(1) > 0.
It follows that any v0 < e v(c) cannot belong to a credible veto set, since,











Straightforward calculations show that
de v(c)
dc > 0 and e v(0) = limc!0 e v(c) > 0.




(e v(0) ￿ y)dG(y) ￿ c > 0.
Such a c0 exists, since the left hand side is continuos in c and strictly positive
when c = 0.
The proof of the proposition is by contradiction. Fix c 2 (0;c0). Suppose
that there exists a credible veto set V and a corresponding bK such that (2)
holds. Let a￿ = inf V . The continuity of payo⁄ functions imply that a￿






￿ ￿ y)dG(y) ￿ c ￿ e v(0)G(c) +
Z e v(0)
c
(e v(0) ￿ y)dG(y) ￿ c > 0;
17where the ￿rst expression is the lowest possible payo⁄ of any vetoer in any
BNE (where all the rati￿ers are participating whenever their valuations are
greater than c). Therefore, all vetoer types must be participating (with
probability one) in every bk, k 2 K.
Suppose a￿ < 1. Let a1 be the lowest cuto⁄ used by a rati￿er in any bk,
k 2 K. Note that a1 > a￿, since any rati￿er with valuation a￿ or less will
lose the auction with probability one if she chooses to participate, and hence
obtain a negative payo⁄. The vetoer types in (a￿;a1) win the auction i⁄ no





















k2K ￿kpk > G(v) =
dUm(v)
dv ;
since pk ￿ G(a1) > G(v) for all k 2 K and
P
k2K ￿k = 1. So, these types
have a strict incentive to veto, and therefore must belong to the veto set,
contradicting (2).
Now suppose that V = f1g. We showed that in every post-veto BNE the
vetoer must participate. Since given this rati￿ers will not participate, there
is a unique equilibrium bk in which
U(1;bk;c) = 1 ￿ c > U
m(1;c);
contradicting the indi⁄erence condition (2).
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